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Three Theories of Individualism

Philip Schuyler Bishop

ABSTRACT

This thesis traces versions of the theory of individualism by three major theorists,
John Locke, John Stuart Mill and John Dewey, as they criticize existing social, cultural,
economic, legal and military conditions of their times. I argue that each theorist modifies
the theory of individualism to best suit their understanding of human nature, adapting it
where they can and outright removing aspects where they cannot. Based upon each
thinker’s conception of human nature, their corresponding theory of individualism does
justice to that nature. With their view of individualism, each thinker criticizes the activities
of their day for its lack of justice to human nature for the bulk of humanity.
I examine each thinker’s concrete conditions, their theory of human nature, theory
of justice and their corresponding theory of individualism. In the first three chapters, I
examine first Locke’s, then Mill’s then Dewey’s theory of human nature, justice and
individualism. In my final chapter, I critically examine each thinker’s theory of
ii

individualism and find that John Dewey’s is most adequate for our current social
conditions.
Locke’s individualism was a criticism of the absolute rule of aristocratic
Land-owners and was an attempt to undermine the conceptual basis for their continued
power. John Stuart Mill’s individualism was a criticism of John Locke’s individualism
insofar as majoritarianism had taken root in England and resulted in the “Tyranny of the
Majority.” Therefore Mill gave high value to the sanctity of the individual even in
disagreement with the overwhelming majority. Dewey’s theory of individualism largely
was a criticism of widespread poverty and abuse of political power in America during the
Great Depression. laissez faire economics, combined with cut-throat competitiveness and
atomistic individualism had resulted in pervasive injustice and Dewey recommended
recognition of our inter-connectedness and continuity rather than our separateness. While
I believe Dewey’s theory of individualism to be most fit for our current social setting, even
his theory suffers from problems yet to be worked out. I lay out these problems in the final
chapter and conclude with remarks on what needs yet to be done.

iii

Foreword

My thesis will trace the origins and consequences of individualism from John
Locke through John Stuart Mill and up to John Dewey. I explore the reasons Dewey gave
for thinking that the old concept of individualism was not fit to solve the problems of his
times. Further, I explore how Dewey recommended for the theory of individualism to be
modified accordingly and why I believe it was more adequate for our times than the
previous two theories offered by Locke and Mill.
My thesis will consist of four chapters. Within each of the first three chapters,
there will be four major sections: first will be a description of the social conditions in
which the thinker lived, next will be a section detailing the thinker’s concept of human
nature, following that is a section dealing with doing justice to one’s nature and finally
how this culminates in a theory of individualism. Chapter one will be an investigation into
the feudal conditions and the rise of old individualism by examining John Locke’s theory
of individualism. In the second chapter I explore the rise of the Industrial Revolution and
Mill’s criticism of its effects in his theory of individualism. In the third chapter I discuss
Dewey’s examination of the changing conditions during the Great Depression following
World War I, his theory of individualism and also how his recommendations are
appropriate to his time. Finally, in the fourth chapter I synthesize my findings, provide
critical comments on each thinker’s theories and provide concluding remarks.
In the 17th Century, those select few individuals who had privilege and power were
kept in their advantaged position because of a widely accepted belief about human nature.
4

This belief was adopted from Judeo-Christian doctrines and buttressed the claims of the
landed gentry during that time. The claims made were regarding their divine right to rule
and their innate wisdom granted by God. John Locke professed an alternate origin for
human knowledge: the tabula rasa combined with empiricism, whereby humans start out
as empty sheets, devoid of any innate knowledge and come to know only through sense
experience. This theoretical move allowed Locke to undermine the dominant political
status quo by questioning the innateness of divine rule by the aristocracy.
Locke further had a belief about the state of nature whereby all individuals are
born equal and entirely free. The formation of government should be a consensual process
in order to better procure the goods of health, life and, most importantly for Locke,
possessions. This is done only by sacrificing some small bit of freedom and liberty so that
the government may procure authority. Justice, for Locke, is the rightful ownership of
property, unhindered liberty and, generally speaking, as close of an approximation to the
“State of Nature” as possible. Justice is, for Locke, the theory whereby private ownership
provides a basis for peaceful cooperation of individuals. It is the role of good government
to preserve as perfectly as possible this state of balance between individual rights and
smooth operation of civil society.
Nearly a century and a half after the publication of Locke’s Two Treaties on
Government, John Stuart Mill wrote On Liberty partially in criticism of the political
conditions brought about by widespread acceptance of Locke’s theories of human nature
and justice. Locke’s theory of governing by majority rule had been taken to its extreme:
the “tyranny of the majority” had emerged. Mill criticizes this by positing a theory of
5

human nature defending the sovereignty of the individual against the majority except in
instances of harm. Mill was concerned first and foremost with interference by
governmental institutions upon individual interests. Humans, in Mill’s view, are inherently
rational and capable of acting as independent agents; they are able to decide what the
good life is. Therefore, social justice will come about from an aggregate of individuals
pursing the good life.
In the early 20th century, John Dewey diagnosed the impact of the Great
Depression upon the people of his time. The calculating quantification of Utilitarianism
had become engrained in the consciousness of his time. Quantification of happiness was
transformed into a business mentality whereby pleasure and pain had to tally up neatly,
just as the bottom line of an annual audit did. The pecuniary culture that was dominant in
his day had led to an imbalance of privilege and power in the hands of the few. This
imbalance led to a new injustice whereby access and availability to the means of acquiring
goods and services required for personal growth, and in some cases survival, was denied
to those outside of the wealthy. Dewey posited a theory of individualism that held
independent agents are always socially situated and composed largely of social
intelligence. Further, he believed that individuals were inseparable from his or her role as
citizens1; therefore, to think of individuals outside of their contextual relevancy (regarding
political status for instance) was to somehow miss the point. Failure to recognize this false
dichotomy of person/citizen would be to fall into a sort of dualism; something Dewey very
much wished to avoid.
1

Citizen, for Dewey, was not merely a legal term. It meant a member of a community and no one was
ever entirely outside of a community unless they lived alone, and completely cut-off from human contact.

6

The theory of human nature that dominated Dewey’s work was recognition of the
plasticity of our innate powers. Our nature is such that we are born with innate capabilities
and it is our cultivation that brings these potentialities to fruition or spoil. Dewey felt
justice was done when individuals were cultivated to expand their capacities and injustice
was performed when the development of habits needed to thrive was denied or when
habits of strict routine were ingrained in individuals, committing them to a life of robotlike existence.
In the final chapter I summarize the thoughts of all three philosophers and provide
critical evaluation. I examine the tensions to be found between Locke’s theory of tabula
rasa and his concept of reason, between his state of nature and state of war; I question the
innateness of war in human nature, as well as apply his theory of ownership to current
corporate practice. I scrutinize the business-like nature of Utilitarianism, Mill’s
consequentialist inclination and I show that current pecuniary practices would result in a
violation Mill’s harm principle. Then I critique Dewey’s optimism regarding Democracy
and its short-comings outside of his specific recommendations and assess his support of
America’s entrance in WWI. Finally I provide my recommendations for what must come
in order to harmonize our concepts with our existing circumstances.

7

Chapter One: John Locke
I. Introduction
In this chapter, I examine John Locke’s theories of human nature, social justice as
well as how he laid out these theories in an attempt to criticize the politico-economic
foundations of the dominant class of his time. I discuss the social and political conditions
of 17th century Britain, paying special attention to the feudal system and the role of labor
in ownership. Then I examine Locke’s theory of human nature and his epistemological
tabula rasa. I show that Locke’s theory was a criticism of the existing social conditions of
his time. Following that, I discuss the relationship between human nature and his theory of
social justice, particularly as it relates to equality, freedom and property ownership. This
section will primarily focus on how Locke’s theory of human nature, in relation to the
existent social conditions, was a criticism of social justice during his time. Finally, I discuss
how Locke believed these theories criticized the theoretical foundation of the landed
gentry with his response: a theory of individualism.

II. Social conditions of the 17th and 18th Century Britain
In the 17th Century, there was a small class of people who controlled political and
economic forces so entirely as to almost exclude anyone outside of their ranks. This class
was called the Aristocracy2 but was the owner of the vast majority of land, resources,
military power and wealth.3 These landed gentry held far more than mere political and
2

Aristocracy is a Greek term for rule by the excellent. While the aristocracy of Locke’s time claimed to be
excellent, insofar as they were direct descendents from Adam, a far better designation for this class would
be the leisure class, the landed gentry or the plutocracy.
3
While land ownership was originally concentrated in the hands of the nobility and the King, during
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economic clout; they were the beneficiaries of the best education, the highest privileges
that possession of wealth could bring, and were the select few capable of playing a part in
guiding the directions of their lives. While it was technically true that a peasant could have
guided the direction of his life by having refused to work for their liege lord. This would
occur by packing up their few meager possessions and going elsewhere; they would have
merely been committing themselves (and their families) to at best destitution (under a
different lord) or at worst starvation.4
Locke recognized this social condition for what it was: an act of social injustice on
a grand scale. It was injustice precisely because peasants were no longer in control of their
own lives, but rather lived, toiled and died at the whims of others. 5 Locke set out to
examine the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings cited by those who would propagate
the continuation of this practice of exclusion.6 Since the conceptual underpinnings of the
Aristocracy were entirely drawn from scriptural origins, Locke first studied the thendominant religio-epistemological basis appealed to by the leisure class. Christianity and its

Locke’s time there was a rise in lump-sum purchasing of land from the aristocracy. This was done for
many reasons, not the least of which was the effects of the bubonic plague on reducing the number of
working peasants and the corresponding drop in productivity. Since nobles “rented” the land from the
King, they in turn had to acquire wealth from their peasants. If the peasants weren’t producing, the nobles
were not making their rent and as such, could no longer afford to sustain larger estates. This combined
with an influx of wealth from Asia and America in the hands of the traders resulted in a tipping of the
scales of land ownership away from the nobility towards the bourgeois.
4
Since the feudal lords owned most land, and land was the sole means of production in an agrarian
economy, peasants found themselves at the whim of the feudal lords. There were instances of peasants
moving from one lord to another, however, they were merely choosing a new master.
5
Peasants of Locke’s time were, in a word, slaves to their feudal lords. Locke says as much in his section
of the Second Treatise on Government titled On Slavery where he discusses a slave as someone forced to
labor for another against their will. However, this ideology did nothing to stop Locke himself from
financially supporting African slave trade.
6
It should be noted that this was done at no small amount of personal danger on Locke’s part; he
published the Two Treaties on Government anonymously as well as fleeing to Holland in order to avoid
persecution.
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scripture were the primary theory behind the practice of total land ownership and absolute
rule of a monarch; the Aristocracy claimed to have unbroken direct lineage from Adam7 to
their day. Therefore Locke directed his criticism at these foundations.
This criticism was primarily leveled at a now-obscure thinker named Robert
Filmer. Filmer was an advocate for absolute rule of a monarch as ordained by scriptural
lineage. Locke criticized this view in his First Treatise and summarized this criticism in the
opening paragraphs of his Second Treatise. I do not take this criticism to be of much
importance to the document in contemporary times; however Locke clearly felt it was of
enough importance to write the entire First Treatise on this topic. The gist of his criticism
is that there is no feasible way for us to trace the lineage from Adam to present day.
Further still, it would not matter were we able to because the world was bequeathed to
mankind as a whole and not just the eldest of Adam’s line. Further, his epistemological
empiricism is used to undermine the then-prevalent concept of knowledge via divine
revelation.8 Since divine revelation was the primary “source” of the Aristocracies’ claims
to supremacy, this criticism was one of considerable weight.
The theoretical support for the Aristocracy allowed them to operate without
political check or balance. There was a vast disparity of wealth and power and it was this
unequal distribution of possessions and ownership that struck Locke as being the central
inequality of the feudal system. If people other than the feudal lords were capable of
owning the land they worked, the Aristocracy would lose its means of control. Concerning

7

The Adam of Christianity’s Genesis.
His empiricism is primarily laid out in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. I take this to be a
continuation of the tradition of Hobbes and Bacon.
8
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criteria to use for determining ownership, Locke explicitly stated that “whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”9 The
land the peasant worked became his precisely because he labored. Working a field is what
made the field owned, not some vague scriptural citation. The Aristocracy claimed to own
it based upon scriptural lineage, but this defense was shown inadequate in the First
Treatise.
If the Aristocracy lost sole right to land ownership, Locke believed that they
would likewise lose their accumulated political and social clout. But one should always be
aware that Locke’s attempt to break the strangle-hold of the Aristocracy is so that
members of his class, the wealthy merchants, bankers and doctors, could obtain control.
One also should not fail to keep in mind that Locke made most of his riches on the
lucrative slave trade to the Americas; evidently his concepts of freedom, private property
and labor extended only skin deep, or perhaps even only as deep as one’s pockets.10

III. Locke’s Theory of Human Nature
Before Locke could begin criticizing the social conditions of his day, he put forth a
natural rights theory to explain what existed prior to the existence of civil governments; he
called this the state of nature. These theories had come into common usage with Hobbes’
Leviathan, but Locke’s theory differed from that of Hobbes. To begin with, he posited

9

Locke, John Second Treatise on Government p. 19.
Glausser, Wayne Three Approaches to Locke and the Slave Trade Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.
51, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1990), pp. 199-216
10
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certain natural rights that existed in the state of nature and also called it “a state of perfect
freedom.”11 One of these rights was freedom, but even though he saw this state of nature
as one of absolute liberty, he did not feel it was
one of license: though man in that state have an uncountable liberty to
dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy
himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some
nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it.12
Freedom does not equate to the ability for a person to hurt themselves. Curiously, Locke
gives no argument for this position aside from an appeal to the will of the creator and out
innate reason which he believed would compel one to realize that:
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of our
omnipotent and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of our sovereign
master … they are his property.13
Because of Locke’s premise that one can not harm oneself, he extrapolates this protection
to other people as well. His is often quoted saying that mankind ought to “preserve the
rest of mankind and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or
impair the life, or what tends to be the preservation of life, the liberty, health, limb or
goods of another.”14 This mutual rational protection built into the state of nature makes it
a time of peace and prosperity. Locke described this state of nature as “men living
together according to reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to
judge between them.”15

11

Ibid p. 8.
Ibid p. 9.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid p. 15.
12

12

It is important at this point to recognize what Locke meant by reason. Locke
believed that reason
so orders the immediate ideas as to discover what connection there is in
each link of the chain, whereby the extremes are held together; and thereby,
as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for, which is that which we
call illation or inference, and consists in nothing but the perception of the
connection there is between the ideas, in each step of the deduction;
whereby the mind comes to see, either the certain agreement or
disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration, in which it arrives at
knowledge; or there probable connection, on which it gives or withholds its
assent, as in opinion.”16
For Locke, reason is the bridge between ideas; it fills in the gap that exists between
separate ideas. In effect, reason is the glue which holds concepts together. Also, reason
can lead to new knowledge, as is the case of demonstration, or lead us away from mere
opinion. This relates to the previous discussion on the state of nature because men are
naturally reasonable creatures and utilize it to determine how to live together in the state
of nature. The knowledge of how to live together peaceably is garnered, presumably, via
demonstration. This can only mean that the mind sees agreement amongst two or more
different ideas and fuses them together through the use of reason.17
For Locke, (1) humans are naturally rational. Further, (2) we are born free;
without an authority above us on this earth. Also, (3) we are born equal. Equality is not
one of capacity, but rather of interest; we all have the same needs and the same rights to
meet those needs. But most importantly, we find that (4) humans also naturally must
respect others. If in the state of nature, a criminal has taken from another, the offended
16

Locke, John An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Chap. XVII, pp. 575-6.
It should not be assumed that Locke believed all men and women were born with full use of reason; he
did not. In fact he details the steps to be taken in order to cultivate reason fully in his work On Education,
and throughout the Second Treatise on Government.
17
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party then has the right and the responsibility to enact reparation. Thus, men have the right
to retribution but only “so far as calm reason and conscience dictate.” In fact, this is the
extent to which individuals may have power over another in the state of nature. This
power is not arbitrary or absolute; it is only ever retributive. Aside from retribution, Locke
believed humans should live in peaceful coexistence by the laws of reason.
However, the state of nature is only part of Locke’s depiction of human nature.
There is a darker half: the state of war. The state of war comes about when an individual’s
property, health or freedom is impinged upon by another. It also comes about when one
person attempts to enslave another; taking freedom is the same as taking life for Locke.
Therefore, when any person attempts to take property, health or freedom, Locke believed
that person had declared war upon another and therefore could be struck down just as a
tiger or lion is struck down; namely, they could be destroyed as violent and dangerous
animals, for that is what they would be.
It is interesting to note at this point that the state of war comes about when the
natural gift of reason is not obeyed. It is only when the peace and tolerance of the state of
nature are not observed that the state of war comes about. However, rationality is
inherent; it is one of the faculties of human nature. A tension arises in Locke’s conception
of rationality as natural when there are people who either choose to ignore it or abuse it.
Positing just the state of nature would not adequately describe the multifaceted actions of
humans; the state of war alone would also be inadequate.18
18

Contrary to Hobbes’ view in Leviathan, chapter XIII, of life as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,”
there have been extended periods of peaceful coexistence. While war has been prevalent in human history,
it has not been omnipresent. It is very much the case the Europe has seen little in the way of peace, but
Europe should not be considered the only case of human existence.
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This tension points to the another facet of Locke’s conception of human nature:
the tabula rasa.19 Locke believed that the human mind was not furnished with innate
knowledge or morality. We start life, as it were, like blank slates of paper, ready to receive
inscription. The process of inscription was sensory experience, and our minds received the
information passively. This conception is the core tenet to Locke’s theory of empiricism
and is important for purposes of this investigation because this theory undermined the
prevalent epistemological theory of his time: divine revelation. Divine revelation,
combined with a supposed direct lineage to Adam had constituted the entrenched
aristocracy’s basis for continued power and land ownership. Locke, by appealing to
sensory information as the primary basis for understanding, had put into question the
statements and justifications of the ruling class.
While Locke’s concept of the tabula rasa means that we are not furnished with
moral knowledge at birth, he also believed humans had innate reason which compelled
them to seek harmony with each other. Yet clearly also, this innate reason is not always
utilized for the purpose of harmony else there would be no state of war. One primary
reason Locke believed that the state of war was possible at all was incomplete
development of reason in most humans, especially those responsible for leading armies to
war.
Human reason, when followed and developed properly, provides rules to live by;
the “law of reason.”20 These rules are not restrictions, in Locke’s conception; they are
instead the very means by which freedom is possible. The law provided by reason
19
20

See Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding especially Book I, section 1.
Locke, John Second Treatise of Government p. 32
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in its true notion, is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and
intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the
general good of those under that law could they be happier without it, the law, as
an useless thing, would of itself vanish; and that ill deserves the name confinement
which hedges us in only from bogs and precipes.21

Insofar as the law of reason assists an agent in accomplishing happiness, it is a good thing.
When it ceases to do so, it ceases to be a law. Without laws to guide action, Locke
believed no one would be free because while reason supplies the means to accomplishing
ends, for Locke it also provides ends. Locke states that “the end of law is not to abolish or
restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in all the states of created beings
capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from
restraint and violence from others.”22
The innateness of reason needs cultivation; humans are not born with a fully
developed capability for reason. Because of the innateness of reason, Locke maintains that
individuals are not considered responsible until they can understand the law. Some people
are incapable of knowing the law, such as the insane, mentally handicapped and children.
The primary need for governance over those lacking reason is their inability to know the
laws of reason; because of their ignorance, they require guidance by one who does know
the laws of reason. Each is considered to be under a guardian; one who is capable of
understanding the law of reason. If a person gains the capability of understanding the law
of reason, as in the case of a child maturing or if insanity is cured, they are free from the
need for governance by another. The appeal to the laws of reason forms yet another basis
21
22

Ibid/
Ibid.
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for Locke to question the absolute rule of a monarch; unless the subjects are to be viewed
as children, incapable of reason, people should be capable of self-rule through knowledge
of the laws of reason. Rule by a single monarch would constitute placing those subservient
to the monarch into a state of nature (or worse a state of war) since the whim of the
monarch controls their lives rather than the laws of reason.23
In the state of nature, people are inherently free; they live entirely by the laws of
reason and are ruled by no other power. It is only when interests conflict, when people fail
to follow the laws of reason, where the state of war comes about. Since reason is
cultivated (or not) and born incomplete, then in a sense it is a failure of education, a failure
to cultivate reason, which leads to conflict. For Locke, if individuals all have cultivated
reason, interests would not conflict and the state of war would not come about.
Locke did not believe that the educational systems of his time cultivated reason
and instead he believed they largely taught unnecessary knowledge. He was opposed to
teaching impractical knowledge and went so far as to suggest that Greek and Latin should
not be taught to children since it was of so little use. Were educational systems to better
assist people in the cultivation of their reason rather than indoctrination or passing on
“useless” knowledge then Locke believed more conflicts could be avoided.
Because Locke believed so strongly in the power of reason and its ability to
discern ways of co-existing, he also believed that people could largely be relied upon to
take into account the affairs and doings of others. Locke believed that this ability to
consider the lives of others made people capable of regulating themselves, which in turn
23

Locke leaves unconsidered the case of a monarch that rules by the laws of reason.
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meant they did not require the added “assistance” of a monarch. His confidence in the
power of reason meant that he trusted in the ability for people to have self-rule.
Self-rule, with the assistance of officials chosen by those who would be ruled,
meant that Locke had provided support for democracy by appealing to human nature. It is
within human’s nature to be capable of reasonable self-rule and co-existence with others,
and in those instances which exceed the ability of any one person to decide, it should be
the aggregate of persons who decide.

IV. Justice and Its Relation to Human Nature
Justice, for Locke, is for humans to live freely, equally, rationally and to own
property by laboring. This final part is of utmost importance because during Locke’s time,
the primary economic means of production was land-ownership. In an agrarian economy,
the primary way to produce is to cultivate land. Those who could not own land were
incapable of ever controlling their own destiny; they would only ever toil for another
because they could never own the means of production. This was so important to Locke
that he believed land-ownership was central to justice. Those who could own land had
justice and those who could not were being done injustice.
As mentioned earlier, Locke felt it was labor alone that separated nature’s
products from man’s ownership. For Locke, when someone else owns the means of
production by which one toils, and takes the fruits of one’s labor in payment for use of
these means they are in effect doing an injustice to one’s nature. Put differently, this
situation would be one where the person laboring would be within the power of another
18

(i.e. the land-owner) and therefore would be in what Locke called the state of war. In
Locke’s chapter on the state of war, he said that “no body can desire to have me in his
absolute power unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my
freedom, i.e. to make me a slave.”24 Were it not the case that feudal lords owned virtually
all lands, people would have had the option of working elsewhere. But the near completeownership of land made this a situation of absolute power over those who worked the
land. The peasants were therefore no better than slaves of their feudal lords by Locke’s
theory.
Having the power over others that the feudal lords possessed was equivalent, in
Locke’s terms, to waging war on their servants. They had demanded their servants to
relinquish their freedom; something Locke felt even their servants were not at liberty to
do.25 Because the Aristocracy promulgated this state of fief-slavery (whereby they
acquired the labor of others, involuntarily, because they owned the land the peasants
toiled) they had committed to a state of war against their servants. Use of force is the very
definition of the state of war for Locke, and this is precisely how the Aristocracy
maintained its strangle-hold: by owning the military resources of the day and utilizing them
to enforce their land-ownership.
Lacking land-ownership meant the peasants of Locke’s time were not free. The
place of a fief is viewed as inferior to that of the lord and as such, the equality of the state
of nature does not exist. According to Locke, the state of war can be resolved by killing

24

Locke, John Second Treatise on Government p. 14. It should be noted that this injustice did not extend
to actual slaves such as the ones he traded.
25
Because the servants were owned by God, not by themselves, as mentioned previously.
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the offender, or if the offending party admits defeat and requests a cease-fire.26
In the section titled “The State of Nature” from Locke’s Second Treatise, he
describes a situation whereby a thief has attempted to steal from another. The offended
party has within their rights the ability to “execute the laws of nature”27 that preserve the
state of nature.

In this situation, executing the laws of nature meant ensuring the

continuation of the state of nature; something that can only be done as long as everyone
lives rationally and in harmony. Since stealing from another is disrupting this harmony,
Locke felt the offended party was within their rights to doll out punishment according to
the crime. Fitting punishment was to be decided by “calm reason and conscience.”28 What
specific punishment would fit the crime is left unstated; also left unstated is a means to
determine punishments outside of appeal to universalizable reason.
Since anyone willing to utilize force to the extreme of killing another was violating
the laws of nature and the harmony of reason, the feudal lords were acting against their
peasant serfs. The use of military force in the enforcement of unjust land-ownership was
breaking what Locke called the laws of nature. Violating the laws of nature undermined
the peace and unity experienced in the state of nature and therefore Locke concluded that
“whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.”29 By this reasoning,
peasants had it within their rights to kill their lords for the injustice done to them by their
hands. This argument was considered a powerful incentive during the Bloodless
Revolution and the American Revolution to break from what they saw as unjust
26
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governmental practices.

V. Locke’s Theory of Individualism
Locke’s conception of an individual appears, on its face, to be one of theological
justification. For Locke, an independent entity is an individual because the creator grants
life. All individuals are created equal in the eyes of the creator, so no one individual has
the right to take it from another. These rights are granted by the ownership of the creator
and unless one wishes to go against the wishes of this creator, one must recognize the
rights of other individuals as well. Human freedom likewise is drawn from a religious
premise that God punishes; because God punishes, we must deserve it, and therefore, we
must be free in order to deserve punishment. Therefore, human freedom is founded on
religious doctrines in Locke’s conception of it.30
While the State of Nature is Locke’s concept of ideal human interaction, the reality
of individuals willing to enter into the state of war necessitates the creation of
governments. Because governments are a necessary evil, individuals sacrifice the absolute
freedom of the state of nature in return for the security of government. In turn,
individualism is tied to the state since the relinquishment of rights to the state effectively
endows the state with the capability to enforce infractions upon those rights by others.
The state, and not the individual, now has the right of redress for wrongs. An individual,
by this light, is not the absolutely free entity of the state of nature and the state of war; the
individual has compromised freedom for rights. This compromise is what we call a
30
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Constitutional State. This is what Locke views as the logical conclusion of his theory of
individualism, a person who operates within the confines of a social contract, but is free
within those confines. Best of all would be an individual who operates according to the
laws of reason and therefore coexists with his or her fellow humans without the need of
government, but that would also require the other person to operate under the laws of
reason. Since humans are born only potentially reasonable and not actually reasonable, the
continued state of nature is not an option.31
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Chapter Two: John Stuart Mill
I. Introduction
This chapter focuses on the writings and thoughts of John Stuart Mill, especially
his theory of human nature derived from Bentham’s utilitarianism, the theory of justice
entailed by this theory and his resulting theory of individualism. To begin, I examine how
this theory of human nature relates to the existent social settings of his time, especially
regarding the rise of the middle class in British political life and the transformation of
Britain’s economy away from an agrarian one and towards an industrial one. Also, one of
the largest political problems of Mill’s time was a result of the subsequent rise in power of
the middle class and the antecedent exertion of their will upon minority groups and under
represented groups.
Mill used D’Toqueville’s phrase “the Tyranny of the Majority” to portray this
practice for what it was: a new brand of injustice. For Mill, this was injustice because of
his belief that autonomy of the individual was based on rationality and freedom; any
movement or law that impinged upon this rationality by forcing the opinions of one group
upon another was doing injustice to the nature of the individual. The use of wage-slavery
during the industrial revolution struck Mill as an injustice on par with the servitude of the
peasant, if not worse. Long work days in dangerous conditions, for little to no
compensation, appeared to Mill as a practice that did not do justice to human freedom or
reason. It was to the end of bringing about widespread freedom, reason and justice that
Mill presented his theory of individualism that will be covered at the conclusion of this
chapter.
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II. Social Conditions of 19th century Britain
Mill lived from 1806 to 1873, the height of the Industrial Revolution and a period
of drastic social change in Great Britain. Britain’s society was beginning to feel the strain
of industrialization and, more than anywhere in the world, was becoming urbanized.
Populations began concentrating in urban centers in order to reap the benefit of plentiful
and well-paying labor to be found in the burgeoning steam-powered factories of London;
lack of urban planning quickly became evident. Indoor plumbing was a rarity and disease
was common in the London slums. Cheap housing combined with shoddy living conditions
and child labor, at the expense of childhood education, made for wide-spread suffering
during this period.
Trends toward centralization of money in the hands of the middle class were
continued, following the fall of the Aristocracy, as wealthy merchants bought and
operated industrial factories. The power associated with ownership of land began to
dwindle as agrarian economies shifted more toward industrial economies; ownership of the
machines of production was quickly becoming the arbiter of social power. Even cultivated
land could not generate the same amount of product as cultivated land using the machines
of industry. Therefore while land ownership was still pivotal regarding political and
economic power, it was waning in its potency due to the rising influence of industrial
machine ownership.
British politics recognized this shift in power and began allowing more voter
influence in the parliamentary system. This was especially apparent with the House of
24

Commons 1832 Reform Act, whereby nearly thirty percent of the British populous were
given the right to vote.32 This began a slow trajectory away from power in the House of
Lords and towards empowering the House of Commons, but even here it was only the
wealthiest of the “commoners” that became empowered. These wealthy few were those
fortunate enough to own the factories and mills that began pooling wealth in their hands.
While the middle class fought for their own suffrage, they enacted extreme
physical suffering on women, children and workers in their factories.33 Even though wealth
continued to centralize in the hands of the few factory owners, living standards for the
average worker were virtually stagnant if not worse than during the feudal period. As
Voth indicates, during the Industrial Revolution “[h]ousehold budget surveys and
alternative indexes of living standards such as the human development index (HDI)
strongly suggest that gains in living standards, broadly defined, were very small.”34
Sixteen hour work days were not uncommon and crippling injuries were far from
abnormal. The working conditions of the poor in England during the Industrial Revolution
were nothing short of a new form of slavery. The feudal system had been replaced for one
of wage-serfdom. Like the peasants of Locke’s time, factory workers needed their job in
order to live. But workers also needed their children to work in order to put food on the
A Brief Chronology of the House of Commons. http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/g03.pdf
This is best demonstrated in the testimonies of children workers and overseers of British factories
during this time. Sixteen hour work days were common as were beatings for slack workers or workers
found dozing off at the job.
34
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table and pay rent for the shoddy home they most likely shared with as many as four other
families. While it is true that children had worked in the fields of their parents during
feudal times, fieldwork was a far cry from factory work.35
Further, because children were working as much as sixteen hours a day, formal
education was all but non-existent among the working class. As Moykr stated, “[i]f
England led the rest of the world in the Industrial Revolution, it was despite, not because
of, her formal education system.”36 Because of this educational void, English children were
not capable of intellectual development until after Child Labor laws were passed.

III. Mill’s Theory of Human Nature
The unique education that John Stuart Mill received from James Mill, his father, in
conjunction with Jeremy Bentham, the founder of Utilitarianism, deeply colored John
Stuart Mill’s thinking and writings. It is not difficult to track the influence of Bentham on
Mill, he openly admits it; but while Mill believed that Bentham possessed “remarkable
endowments for philosophy” and amazing abilities at drawing correct conclusions from
premises, he also believed that Bentham was one “whose general conception of human
nature and life, furnished him with an unusually slender stock of premises.”37 Mill hoped to
“enlarge the number of premises while retaining Bentham’s method and basic principle.”38
Therefore the common scholarly mistake of equating the views on human nature
held by Bentham with those held by J. S. Mill appears odd; however this mistake is
35
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factually inaccurate and intellectually misleading. Mill dedicated himself to “expanding” on
Bentham’s “slender stock of premises” about human nature and while Bentham believed
that humans were primarily (if not entirely) motivated by pursuit of pleasure and
avoidance of pain, Mill believed in a more nuanced view. Utilizing the “method of
Bentham,” Mill carefully outlined the principles upon which his ethical system is based,
starting with the principle of utility and expanding upon it until he arrives at his political
conclusions.
But Mill was meticulous enough to include the arguments for why he held each
principle in the hierarchy that he held them in. To begin, he felt that “[a]ll action is for the
sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole
character and colour from the end to which they are subservient.” 39 This consequentialist
bent belies unstated preference for teleological explanations; an inclination that is
understandable but nonetheless left unstated.
Mill demonstrated why he shied away from the deontological theories for
explaining human action, then popular, by criticizing Kant’s Metaphysics of Morality. Mill
felt bald intentionality was inadequate, even for a deontologist, at describing the range of
moral behavior. Instead he stated that a goal is not what prevents us from acting
immorally, but rather the fact that “the consequences of [the goal’s] universal adoption
would be such as no one would choose to incur.”40 The motivating force is avoidance of a
certain set of consequences, so actions are taken in such a way as to steer clear of those
outcomes. The motivating force is the concrete consequence to be avoided, not merely
39
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our distaste of selecting such a goal.
Like Kant before him, Mill also believed there was an ultimate principle in the
actions of humans. For Kant, it was the Categorical Imperative, while for Mill it was the
Greatest Happiness Principle. According to Mill, this principle states that
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended
pleasure, and the absence of pain, by unhappiness, pain and the privation of
pleasure.41
Mill further posits that
pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and
all the desirable things … are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in
themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of
pain.42
These two aspects of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain simultaneously form Mill’s
Greatest Happiness Principle. While this formulation sounds deceptively similar to
Bentham’s own, it is nevertheless different to the degree that Mill believed in qualitative
and ethical hedonism rather than psychological hedonism.
A common and loud criticism of Utilitarianism is that seeking pleasure and
avoiding pain is a philosophy appropriate only for lower beasts, but Mill did not believe
this made Utilitarianism into a doctrine “worthy only of swine” for its obvious hedonistic
slant. Rather Mill believed those who view it this way are too narrowly interpreting
hedonism. Mill felt the comparison of hedonism with lower beasts was disingenuous
because
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if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to
swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good
enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of
beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast’s pleasures do not
satisfy a human being’s conceptions of happiness.43
Mill felt human Reason elevated us above the wants and desires of mere brutish beasts
because “[h]uman beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when
once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include
their gratification.”44 Mill added that he was unaware of any thoroughly hedonistic
philosophy that did not “assign to the pleasures of the intellect, or the feelings and
imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those
of mere sensations.”45 Mill’s most well-known remark given in defense of this ethical
hedonism is that “[i]t is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”46 Said differently, the appreciation of art,
theater, poetry and philosophy, the desire to experience events that no “beast” would be
capable of experiencing does not undermine the fact that desire for those pleasures and
avoidance of pain primarily motivates humans according to Mill.
It is important at this juncture to note Mill’s adherence to a further clarification of
the Greatest Happiness Principle. Mill felt it was not merely the happiness of the individual
agent, but the Greatest Happiness for the greatest number that mattered most. Some
object that without this clarification, Mill’s system yields a narrowly selfish system
whereby people go about seeking their own pleasure at the expense of others. In response
43
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to this possible objection, Mill goes on to state that “there can be no doubt that the world
in general is immensely a gainer by it [nobleness].”47 It was to this end that Mill said to
“always act from the inducement of promoting the general interests of society.”48 There is
recent neurological data that supports Mill’s belief that other’s pleasure is as important as
one’s own pleasure, leading credence to his distrust of egoistic reductions of his theories
of human nature.49
But in order to act toward the betterment of society, one must be the captain of
one’s destiny. Mill believed that “none but a person of confirmed virtue is completely
free.”50 51 But freedom here is not meant in the metaphysical sense
A person feels morally free who feels that his habits or his temptations are
not his masters, but he theirs: who even in yielding to them knows that he
could resist; that were he desirous of altogether throwing them off, there
would not be required for that purpose a stronger desire than he knows
himself to be capable of feeling.52
Freedom, for Mill, is the ability to direct formation of one’s own character and not some
metaphysical quality of mind that is distinct and separate. Mill believed that freedom is the
feeling of directing one’s own life.
Because Mill believed freedom was practical freedom, also known as political
47
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freedom, he further believed that freedom had its limitations. He stated that
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively,
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is selfprotection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.53
This concept has come to be known as Mill’s harm principle and it denotes his primary
and most meaningful check on human freedom: whether or not one’s actions bring harm
to another. If the action does not harm another, it is acceptable. If it does bring harm, it
limits the freedom of others and therefore is self-contradictory. One’s own freedom, for
Mill, can not come at the price of another’s. The harm principle follows logically from
Mill’s Greatest Happiness Principle because if the right thing to do is to promote
happiness and reduce pain, any action that produces happiness in one individual but also
produces pain in another could not be sought unless the happiness of the one far
outweighed the pain caused to the other. When pushed, Mill also stresses the need to hold
a principle similar to the Golden Rule.54
Political opponents of Mill’s cited the unchanging nature of humans as their basis
for viewing humans as by and large evil creatures, but Mill believed that much of what
went by the name of human nature in his day was what Aristotle called “second nature.”
Culture, not instincts, was what Mill believed shaped much of human action. If Mill’s
belief is true, then much of what was viewed as “bad” about human nature was acquired
and not innate. Therefore the primary means to solving the overwhelming bulk of
humanity’s problems, according to Mill, was to change the circumstances by which the
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problems arise. He briefly summarizes this view by saying that
I have long felt that the prevailing tendency to regard all the marked
distinctions of human character as innate, and in the main indelible, and to
ignore the irresistible proofs that by far the greater part of those
differences, whether between individuals, races, or sexes, are such as not
only might but naturally would be produced by differences in
circumstances, is one of the chief hindrances to the rational treatment of
great social questions, and one of the greatest stumbling blocks to human
improvement.55
Mill went on to act upon this belief by attempting to enact the first Women’s suffrage laws
in Britain, successfully enacting child labor laws, animal welfare and many other social
reforms.
Human nature, for Mill, was also largely determined. In his System of Logic, he
gives one of the strongest defenses of determinism in the canon of Western philosophy.
There he describes Necessity as
simply this: that, given the motives which are present to an individual's
mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the
manner in which he will act might be unerringly inferred; that if we knew
the person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting upon
him, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict
any physical event.56
He further shows his support for this doctrine in the next chapter where he states that
depending in the main on those circumstances and qualities which are
common to all mankind, or at least to large bodies of them, and only on a
small degree on the idiosyncrasies of organisation or the peculiar history of
individuals; it is evidently possible, with regard to all such effects, to make
predictions which will almost always be verified, and general propositions
which are almost always true.57
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A common criticism of Mill’s view of human nature focuses on his attention to human
freedom opposed to our nature as determined by forces outside of human control.58 He
revised his views as he grew older without ever completely abandoning the position of
determinism. But perhaps this tension is only superficial. Mill could very well have
believed that while human behavior and action was almost (or entirely) determined by
forces outside of our control, still the feeling of freedom was valuable to humans,
therefore people should adopt practices such that they support human freedom. According
to Mill, even though people can not choose to accept or deny the argument (being
determined), the knowledge of the argument acts as one more factor in their future
judgments.

IV. Justice and its Relation to Human Nature
Mill dealt with Justice directly in the last section of his work titled Utilitarianism.
There he utilized the Greatest Happiness Principle as the arbiter of Justice. Because
happiness is not just one’s own pleasure, but also pleasure of others, sympathetically
experienced, we can conceive of Justice. Mill states that the
idea of justice supposes two things; a rule of conduct, and a sentiment
which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all
mankind, and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire
that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.59
I take the rule of conduct to be his Greatest Happiness principle. Alternately, I take the
sentiment for Justice to be a natural feeling to Mill as the
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animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those
whom one sympathizes, widened so as to include all persons, by the human
capacity of enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent
self-interest.”60
This desire itself stems from the idea of rights. For Mill, a right “reside[s] in the injured
person, and [is] violated by the injury”61 A right is something owed to a person by a
community; something expected and agreed upon. Mill states that a right is violated when
one of five things occurs: 1) when liberty is deprived, 2) when a law that ought to be a law
is disobeyed, 3) when someone is deprived that which they deserve, 4) when faith in an
obligation is broken and 5) when judgment is partial and preference is shown where favor
and preference are not due.62
This conception of injustice falls perfectly in line with Mill’s view of human nature.
Because we desire freedom and value it, when this is removed we take harm. The desire to
receive what we deserve comes from a psychological state of pleasure. This pleasure
extends to doling out punishment, as well and Mill remarks that
It would always give pleasure, and chime in with our feelings of fitness,
that acts which we deem unjust should be punished though we do not
always think it expedient that this should be done by the tribunals.63
Since the Greatest Happiness Principle applies beyond our own pleasure, we should also
take pleasure when others receive benefits from social interaction. Even were we to adopt
a selfish attitude there is one thing that no “human being could possibly do without”:
security. Mill believed that security is important to rational self-interested humans because
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on it we depend for all our immunity from evil, and for the whole value of
all and every good, beyond the passing moment; since nothing but the
gratification of the instant could be of any worth to us, if we could be
deprived of everything the next instant by whoever was momentarily
stronger than ourselves.64
The need to protect ourselves involves cooperation with others. Because we depend on
others, if for nothing else other than for them not to harm us, we should seek the common
good.
Mill’s conceptions of freedom as essential to happiness, being the arbiter of good
and bad, combined with his conception of reason, being the expander of our natural
sentiments so as to include the multiplicity of humanity in our own happiness, results in his
theory of justice.

V. Mill’s Theory of Individualism
Before Mill’s conception of the individual, Kant had reconstructed Locke’s views.
He rejected theological grounds for individuals and instead posited metaphysical grounds
in their place. Kant wished to make the theory of individualism more inclusive than
Christians alone by removing the need for theological foundations. Kant grounded the
theory instead upon assumptions about the ontology of persons, especially related to their
free will. Mill wished to make individualism even more widely acceptable by removing the
need for metaphysical agreement. Instead Mill based his theory upon psychological
concepts regarding pleasure and pain.
This basis of pleasure and pain placed the theory of individualism within the realm
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of empirical verification (or falsification). If persons were such that Mill’s ethical hedonism
motivated their actions, his conception of justice logically followed. Mill likewise rejected
the need for a social contract when he stated that
A favorite contrivance has been the fiction of a contract, whereby at some
unknown period all the members of society engaged to obey the laws, and
consented to be punished for any disobedience to them; thereby giving to
their legislators the right, which it is assumed they would not otherwise
have had, of punishing them, either for their own good or for that of
society … I need hardly remark, that even if the consent were not a mere
fiction, this maxim is not superior in authority to the others which it is
brought in to supersede.65
Mill felt the “fiction” of a social contract did nothing to solve the problems it had been
created for. Mill’s belief that we can only interfere in the affairs of another when they do
harm to others means that the social contract would be null and void least harm were
done. Further, Mill clearly rejects the concept of having some contract be binding which
was signed ages ago, if at all. Therefore, rather than base his conception of individualism
on theological, metaphysics or contractual foundations, he instead girds it with
psychology. The result is his theory of individualism. Mill believed that individuals were
the arbiters of their own actions and so he is considered to be one of the strongest
proponents for liberalism, checked only by his harm principle.
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Chapter Three: John Dewey
I. Introduction
I examine various writings of John Dewey’s related to individualism and place
them within the context of late 19th century and early 20th century America’s concrete
social conditions. Next I examine his theory of human nature with its three components of
habit, impulse and intelligence. Because Dewey valued the ability of intelligence to free us
from the shackles of routine, it stands as a vitally important aspect of his theory of human
nature. Therefore I show how his theory of individualism was a criticism of pressing and
concrete social injustices of his day, especially widespread unemployment and continued
wealth inequality. I examine Dewey’s desire for social equality and what he called growth,
particularly as it relates to a democratic way of life. Living democratically, for Dewey,
was growing and utilizing social intelligence to reshape habits and direct impulses and
therefore doing justice to one’s nature. A democratic culture and way of life, cultivating
the growth of independent people is Dewey’s theory of individualism.

II. Social Conditions of 20th Century America
Dewey was born just before the final shots of the American Civil War were fired.
While he did not directly experience the war, he was intimately familiar with its
consequences. He did not grow up in the South, and while he was not faced directly with
the economic depression that followed the conflict, neither were the Northern states
entirely isolated from its effects. Even though Dewey was raised in a mostly rural area of
Vermont, and later attended the University of Vermont, he was acutely aware of poverty
37

in America.66
One of the more influential events in Dewey’s life was the formation of his
Laboratory School at Chicago. It was during his time with the Laboratory School that
Dewey came to realize the plasticity of human nature combined with the developmental
aspect of human culture. His experience with the education and psychological
development of children contributed to his movement away from Hegelian idealism and
toward experimentalism. Here he saw firsthand how it was that individual children came to
acquire knowledge. Rather than rationalizing about the necessary conditions for the
possibility of knowledge, Dewey could see children acquiring knowledge of the world and
applying it. The experience deeply affected his concept of philosophy and was a
contributing factor in his turning away from idealism and toward a naturalistic world-view.
The build-up of the United States’ entrance into World War I likewise effected a
change in Dewey’s thinking, especially in light of his own involvement supporting the
armed entrance of the United States into World War I.67 While Dewey “regarded no event
as completely inevitable,”68 he had come to accept that America’s hand was being forced
and that, by and large, would have no alternative except to escalate and enter the war as
more than a financier and munitions dealer.. Dewey believed that a failure on America’s
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behalf to enter the war as a fighting force would very likely result in German triumph;
something he also believed would eventually spell disaster for America.69
Following the war and because of the rise of monopolistic corporatism,
information propaganda and global recessions, laissez faire economics had failed to fulfill
its promissory note of equality and public good. Rather than ushering in a golden era of
human relations, Dewey believed laissez faire economics of “hands off” governance had
wrought devastating consequences upon those least capable of overcoming hardship.
Factors combined after the 1920’s to bring about the single largest economic depression
the United States has ever experienced: the Great Depression.
During the Great Depression, massive unemployment, unchecked inflation and
widespread poverty arose with increased crime and rampant hunger. In effect, new
injustices had emerged from changing economic situations. The 1932 Presidential election
centered on the cause of the Great Depression, with Hoover claiming it was the global
depression largely caused by the war while Roosevelt blamed the Republican policies
during the 1920’s and underlying flaws in the American economy.70
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Nelson, Cary The Depression in the United States--An Overview
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Dewey witnessed the Great Depression and declared continued faith in laissez
faire to be nothing more than a shadow of a dream. Allowing unchecked freedom of
business had resulted not in ever more just distributions of opportunity but rather in brutal
disruption of competition through “legal” albeit unjust channels and the subjugation of
workers to bring about sweat-shop conditions in order to maximize profits.
The living conditions of workers were never so obvious to Dewey until his
experience with Jane Adams and her Hull House from 1892 to Addam’s death in 1935.
There he worked with, what today goes under the moniker of “charity,” to meliorate the
lives of people who were economically downtrodden by providing adult education. Rather
than critiquing theories of poverty and labor in abstraction, Dewey was able to directly see
the effects of poverty and what specific conditions led to its continuation and cessation.
Despite the efforts of the Hull house, widespread poverty continued while massive
concentration of wealth brought about an era of decadence for the minority, side-by-side
with crushing poverty for the majority. This crushing poverty, combined with the inability
for the average citizen to direct their future and live democratically, is what Dewey viewed
as widespread injustice.

III. Dewey’s Theory of Human Nature
Dewey’s theory of human nature aimed, as elsewhere, to remove dualisms and he
specifically focused on the popular distinction of his time: nature versus nurture. 71 Locke’s
theory of human nature was implicitly a discussion of an innate, inborn human freedom.
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This belief in an innate human freedom continues to this day as the basis for universal
human rights, but it also is the bedrock for the older theories of individualism still
dominant today. Dewey overcame this distinction of innateness against environmental
factors by discussing the primacy of habit in human conduct, the role of impulse and the
function of intelligence.
Rather than stating a dualistic opposition between environmental conditions and
innateness, Dewey discussed how it would be possible for biological impulses to be
shaped by cultural acquisition, and each in turn directed by the use of intelligence. While
all humans share a common biological heritage, the cultural differences between time and
place are often overlooked when philosophers discuss human nature. Rather than seeking
what is true across time and from place to place, most philosophers take the unspoken
assumptions of their specific culture as immutable aspects of human nature. All too often
“philosophical premises taken to be absolute truths of human nature and the good are
instead only the consequential reflections, in intellectual life, of the historical and cultural
circumstances that gave them birth.”72
Dewey turned this static view of human nature “on its head” by positing that even
though accumulated cultural practices were “dominant” in the directing of human action,
habit was inert without biological impulse. He saw impulse as resulting in one of three
possibilities: either it is 1) “surging, explosive discharge –blind, unintelligent,” or it could
be 2) “sublimated – that is, become a factor coordinated intelligently with others in a
continuing course of action” otherwise it was 3) “neither immediately expressed in isolated
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spasmodic action, nor indirectly employed in an enduring interest. It may be
‘suppressed.’”73 Impulse is capable of blindly groping explosively, re-shaping habits or
suppressing habits.
While accumulated habit may act as a channel for the energies of impulse, they are
never so thoroughly ingrained as to completely contain it. Our habits could become so
“second-nature” (to borrow an Aristotelian term) as to appear as a native stock of powers
and abilities, and even sometimes to confuse philosophers into thinking of them as native
apparatus; but habits can be undone, inborn nature can not. At best, inborn nature can be
suppressed.
Direction of energies may be largely determined by learned response, but impetus
to action is always impulsive. Anger, sexual desire, hunger and fear may be readily
understandable, but they are only expressible and meaningful in light of acquired habits.
The impulse motivates while the habit enacts. Taken individually, fear may appear selfcontained or even instinctual. But Dewey claims this is not so. The sensation of dread is
never twice the same. It also encapsulates different subjects. Fear of birds is a different
thing than fear of public speaking. Each fear has its own actions, separate and different
and each learned.
However, Dewey also saw a role for intelligence in human nature. Intelligence is
not equivalent with acquired habits or native impulses, but rather is shaped by and in-turn
shapes each. Habits “restrict [intelligence’s] reach, they fix its boundaries,”74 and “the
routineer’s road is a ditch out of which he cannot get, whose sides enclose him, directing
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his course so thoroughly that he no longer thinks of his path or his destination.” 75 But
habits can also play a liberating role for “the more numerous our habits the wider the field
of possible observation and foretelling. The more flexible they are, the more refined is
perception in its discrimination and the more delicate the presentation evoked by
imagination.”76
Habits may restrict the field of view, but they also make room for the possibility of
expanding it. “Rigid” habits are difficult to escape while “flexible” and “refined” ones
make for the possibility of expansion and growth. It should be noted that
habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not of itself stop to think,
observe or remember. Neither does impulse of itself engage in reflection or
contemplation. It just lets go. Habits by themselves are too organized, to
insistent and determinate to need to indulge in inquiry or imagination. And
impulses are too chaotic, tumultuous and confused to be able to know even
if they wanted to. 77
Dewey stated that the function of intelligence is to act as the arbiter between impulse and
habit; it is the knowing aspect of human nature. Since neither habit nor impulse is capable
of bringing to terms “old habit and new impulse,” Dewey concluded there must also be an
intelligence aspect of human nature.
Intelligence directs impulses that would otherwise randomly grope and applies the
steadying influence of old habits to new situations. Fear of the unknown or hatred toward
unspecified objects is the spasm of muscles and wasted effort. Without concrete, discreet
and specific acquired reactions, fear is just recoil and anger is just explosion of thought.
Each of the three facets of human nature work in tandem and “without habit there is only
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irritation and confused hesitation. With habit alone there is a machine-like repetition, a
duplicating recurrence of old acts. With conflict of habits and release of impulse there is
conscious search.”78
This “conscious search” Dewey terms inquiry, following in Peirce’s intellectual
footsteps. Inquiry, for Dewey, is the ordered investigation into problematic situations, the
use of intelligently modified habits to guide impulsive inquisitiveness about otherwise
frustrating obstacles. Those who lack the properly “flexible” and “refined” habits required
to engage in thorough inquiry are largely incapable of overcoming novel and unforeseen
impediments. The inability to overcome problems faced results in discomfort, frustration,
confusion and tends to bring about indifference, lethargy and laziness. It isn’t that human
nature is inherently lazy but rather the concrete social conditions are such that laziness
naturally follows. To blame a poor person who works a routine job for their desire to get
the most done with the least effort is not to blame an unchanging aspect of human nature
but rather a specific cultural response to industrial work.
Continued inability to overcome repeated obstacles may result in random,
perturbed groping impulses at best or resigned apathy at worst. Neither apathy nor blind
fumbling is likely to bring about concrete change and so those individuals lacking the
“habit of learning”79 must resign themselves to forces beyond their control; forces that
perhaps act largely outside of their comprehension. This resignation is acceptance of the
individual’s incapability of changing their situation. Being incapable of changing one’s
situation is what Dewey viewed as the absence of freedom. Unless these shackled
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individuals happen upon fortune or inheritance, they will continue to be trapped in
circumstances beyond their control; they will live at the whim of others.
Because Dewey viewed culture as one of the strongest platforms for human
freedom, due to the liberating ability of “flexible” habits such as the habit of learning, he
saw maintaining the democratic institutions which brought about liberating culture as one
of the primary roles for philosophy. Among the democratic institutions, Dewey believed
education was of the utmost importance due to its directing influence upon acquired
culture. Education, for Dewey, had the possibility of encapsulating and directing the habits
of those being educated far more effectively and directly than any other institution.
However, this is not to say that Dewey believed education operated in a vacuum.
Economic, political and religious influences also held sway in his view of cultural
transmission, but yet he had faith in the transformative power of experimental education.
Critics of Dewey often point to the existing public education system as being the
result of his push for universal education. However, such appeals are half-hearted at best.
Little of what Dewey believed was important in acquiring the habit of learning goes on in
contemporary schools (much less the schools of his time). Experimentation, practice and
social intelligence were the factors Dewey stressed, not regimentation, standardization and
objectification of knowledge. Such practices fly in the face of Dewey’s efforts to expand a
democratic culture through universal education and supplant it with yet one more
influence that retards human freedom rather than expanding it.
So tightly interwoven is “innate” human nature and acquired culture that in no
uncertain terms, the acquired habits of humans are their freedom. Lacking free and flexible
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habits, a human is consigned to a life of routine. But habits do not come into existence exnihilo; they are acquired from the culture where a human being is situated and the culture
is a complex of factors largely beyond the control of any one human. In a democratic
culture, the people that are raised with it have the capability to direct their own lives,
intellectually grow and change their concrete conditions. In a culture largely dominated
and made static and unchanging, people are consigned to their fates as determined by
chance of birth, class, station and other “accidental” properties rather than those
“essential” properties shared by all.
Dewey’s recognition that even culture was influenced by and in turn influenced
other factors that shape the growth of individuals meant he did not believe in a single
“underlying cause” that brought about the existent conditions. Rather, the complex of
institutions work in tandem to act as the conditions under which individuals find
themselves situated. Changing one may or may not bring about a change in consequence
because these factors overlap and co-determine outcomes. Merely insuring political
freedom is not enough to bring about lasting freedom, since the democratic institutions do
not maintain themselves.

IV. Justice and its Relation to Human Nature
Dewey spent most of his time “lobbying” for a theory of justice that can be roughly
stated as equality. By equality he did not mean an equality of capability, but rather one of
need.80 When discussing standards of living, he described one canon of social justice as
80
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that “which demands for all equal industrial opportunities.”81 Elsewhere he describes
justice as “mutual benefit.”82 One historian of thought described Dewey’s efforts as
one long sustained endeavor to break down such dualisms as that between
subject and object, experience and nature, mind and body, duty and desire,
the individual and society, the school and society, the child and curriculum,
means and ends, moral values and science, the religion and the secular, the
spiritual and the material, God and the world. In these divisions, Dewey
found the heart of what he viewed as the pressing social and intellectual
problems of the age. Overcoming these separations became for him both
the way of individual freedom and growth and the road to social justice.83
Equality of industrial opportunity, mutual benefit, individual freedom and attainment of
personal growth make up the core of justice for Dewey. As he has said of other thinkers,
however, it should be noted that this is of course a matter of his concrete social
conditions. Had industrial opportunity not been an issue, because of abundance, it would
very likely have never appeared as an issue of injustice for Dewey. But in his time, the
inability for nearly twenty-five percent of the working population to find paying
occupation so contributed to the social ills of his day as to eclipse other pressing matters.
Dewey believed that the ideology of a previous era, the creed of the pioneer and
frontiersman, continued in verbal assent but not in practice. The “rugged” individualism of
the explorers or the Settlers was a concept of a bygone era 84, yet still it held persuasive
influence. The “mostly settled” and “mostly stable” America of the early 20th century had
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given rise to a far more inter-connected and “corporate” life than that of the survivalist or
woodsman. He saw the concept of competition combined with outdated individualism no
longer relevant to concrete conditions as the primary culprits for social ills of his day.
Even though self-sufficiency had become merely nominal assent of a by-gone era, without
recognition of the inter-subjective cooperative environment of contemporary business
practices and social situations, people would be a “house divided”85 within themselves.
Dewey’s first criticism of competition conjoined with individualism is that
“competition cuts both ways.”86 When multiple employers seek labor, and compete among
themselves to pay for it, the laborer is given the ability to select and choose the best price
and working conditions; the reverse is true for the employer: situations where the
employer is pitting laborers against one another leads to sweat-shop conditions.
The second and seemingly fatal objection to competition as a means to
justice, is that free competition under an individualistic system tends to
destroy itself. For the enormous powers which the new forms of economic
agency and technique give to the individual who can wield them, enable
him to crush competitors.87
Individualism as a means to overthrow entrenched class interests, or friendly competition
alone may not necessarily be self-defeating, but the confluence of an outdated concept
with fierce competitive practice is inwardly destructive. Individual gain combined with
competitive practice may benefit a select few economically, but on the whole it damages
many (perhaps even those who “benefit” from it due to the ingrained habits they must
acquire to continue its practice). This taken with an obsession for material advance rather
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than social welfare lead to “[l]aissez-faire individualism hinder[ing] progress toward the
democratic ideal by mistaking progress in technological control over the physical
environment for progress in freedom.”88
It is important at this point to remember Dewey’s view of human nature; the role
of intelligence in expanding habits and redirecting impulse is an inherent part of our
psychological make-up. When it is stifled by rigidly acquired habits we are, in effect, doing
injustice to our nature. The condition of the sweat-shop promotes blind routine; it
promotes the acquisition of excessively inflexible habits. These habits commit the sweatshop workers to a life of the “routineer” whereby they are largely ruled by their habits,
moving from one situation to another with little conscious oversight. This dull,
monotonous lifestyle is the antithesis of what Dewey felt was the “only meaningful ethic”
of growth.
Growth is the central facet of Dewey’s philosophy because it stems from
overcoming problematic situations through inquiry, through the use of intelligence. Dewey
defines inquiry as “the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation
into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the
elements of the original situation into a unified whole.”89 The use of inquiry according to
this definition results in ordering, directing, overcoming the indeterminate and becoming
determinable.
When telescoped to the largest and most general problems facing a society, inquiry

88

Radin p. 544.

89

Dewey, John Logic: A Theory of Inquiry lw 12.108.

49

does not result in regulation of other humans (totalitarianism) but a harmonizing of
individuals to their society. Inquiry on the largest scale is when people interact in a
democratic fashion, when people use intelligence as a “community of inquirers”90 to
overcome systemic problems facing them, as a collective. But inquiry is not the use of
authority to dictate final or ultimate solutions. Rather, it is
[w]hen an expert tells a farmer he should do thus and so, he is not setting
up for a bad farmer an ideal drawn from the blue. He is instructing him in
methods that have been tried and that have proved successful in procuring
results. In a similar way we are able to contrast various kinds of inquiry
that are in use or that have been used in respect to their economy and
efficiency in reaching warranted conclusions.91
In this way, the role for education in bringing about justice becomes clear. Schools and
curricula should be designed to assist students in developing the habit of learning, the habit
of inquiry. By cultivating the scientific method and applying it in ever wider aspects of
human experience, Dewey believed intelligence could be used to further human freedom.
We would be doing justice to our nature as the growth of our habits allowed us to
overcome indeterminate situations faced rather than being at the whim of forces beyond
our comprehension or control.

V. Dewey’s Theory of Individualism
Rather than dwelling on the concepts and ideologies from previous times and
places to explain and buttress his concept of human nature and justice, Dewey turned
instead to existent situations. America had become corporate, inter-dependent and
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collectively oriented. Therefore Dewey believed a collective mentality should be adopted
to better interact with the existing environment. Only as our outward actions and thoughts
harmonized with concrete reality would individuals cease to be lost and inwardly divided.
This does not end with a meek acquiescence of the status-quo, but rather a re-organization
to overcome a problematic disconnect. Even were this divide to be overcome tomorrow,
the harmonized ideology and concrete conditions would form the basis for new and
different obstacles not currently considered, but a method and a means for overcoming
those problems would be in place.
Dewey believed the way to overcome problematic situations is already available
and known. Previous philosophers laid the foundation and
started not from science, not from ascertained knowledge, but from moral
convictions, and then resorted to the best knowledge and the best
intellectual methods available in their day to give the form of demonstration
to what was essentially an attitude of will, or a moral resolution to prize
one mode of life more highly than another, and the wish to persuade other
men that this was the wise way of living.92
By utilizing the “best knowledge and best intellectual methods” we can utilize social
intelligence and share knowledge acquired by past experts, modify it to fit current
situations using intelligence and collectively tackle the problems we face. This is the basis
upon which Dewey formulated his theory of individualism.
The knowledge of individuals, when seen as parts of a whole rather than atomistic
points, can come together in democratic activities to investigate, inquire and seek out
solutions. Dewey stated that:
Science and invention, which are themselves a fine illustration of the
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balance and interaction between individual and social intelligence,
individual effort and social cooperation, are making possible in many ways
a state of society in which men have at once greater freedom and greater
power through association, greater individual development and greater
socialization of interests, less private property but greater private use and
enjoyment of what is common.93
This use of science, invention, past inquiries and social intelligence results in community
oriented individuals, who realizes their interdependent nature, and who are capable of
overcoming obstacles they face. He is not advocating a “nanny state” but rather a culture
of cooperation over and above one of cut-throat competition. He would not have
supported a government that promoted dependency, because dependent citizens are not
free to choose their own fates.
Dewey’s theory of individualism was not an attempt to introduce herd-mentality.
In fact, he would be chagrined at the prospect of blind obedience to his suggestions, or
dogmatic adherence to his findings. His student, John Herman Randall Jr., said it best
when he stated that
Dewey did not want his experimental and tentative conclusions parroted, or
reduced to a creed. He wanted men to go on working on his problems - that is, on
the kind of intellectual problems that seemed important to him.94
Dewey’s investigation was but one step in a long inquiry. The individualism left to us by
Dewey can best be regarded as a step toward the Great Community. It was Dewey’s hope
that this movement would occur within his lifetime, because beliefs transmitted from the
past had come to him in such a way that he saw a way to transform the problems facing
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him, clearing up the confusions passed down to him and proceeding in aiding others in the
process of growth. Sidney Hook, another student of Dewey’s, characterized him as
the philosopher of human growth in the age of modern science and
technology, as the philosopher who saw man not as a creature with a fixed
nature, whether conceived as a fallen soul or a soulless configuration of
atoms, but as a developing mind-body with an historical career, who
because he does something in and to the world, enjoys some degree of
freedom, produces consequences never witnessed before, and leaves the
world different from the world into which he was born95
I share Hook’s conception of Dewey and I believe that his humanism, combined with his
faith in human intelligence and his optimism concerning human freedom paint him not as
the technocrat his critics sometimes describe him as, nor as a extremist as political
detractors often labeled him, but rather as a philosopher of growth.
Etched upon Dewey’s tombstone is the final paragraph from his book A Common
Faith, a work he undertook in an attempt to make way for a naturalist faith: a faith in
science, reason and humanity. In that paragraph, Dewey strove to show that
the ideal ends to which we attach our faith are not shadowy and wavering.
They assume concrete form in our understanding of our relations to one
another and the values contained in these relations. We who now live are
parts of a humanity that extends into the remote past, a humanity that has
interacted with nature. The things in civilization we most prize are not of
ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the
continuous human community in which we are a link. Ours is the
responsibility of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the
heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may
receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more
generously shared than we have received it. Here are all the elements for a
religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class or race. Such a faith
has always been implicitely the common faith of mankind. It remains to
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make it explicit and militant.96
It is my contention that Dewey’s faith in the “continuous human community” characterizes
most fully his theory of individualism.
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Chapter Four: Critical Evaluations
I. Introduction
Having grown up in a culture largely dominated, in name at least, by the belief in
individual effort, hard work and just rewards, I was aware of a general theory of the
rugged individual. But like most, I was unaware of its origin and evolution. I knew it was
an important belief that was central to economic theory, political parties and to some
extent the business mind and American culture writ large, but I had only a superficial
understanding of it. I remember hearing once, as an undergraduate, the Greeks had no
idea of individualism; the concept utterly baffled me. Did they not recognize their
separateness? Did they not recognize that they each had thoughts, beliefs and desires
different from their fellow citizens? It was only later, when I began the investigation into
individualism, when I realized those aspects were merely superficially part of a theory of
individualism; far more important is what is native to all humans. Is the desire for freedom,
the desire to privately possess property or the desire to possess power native to all
humans? Is the avoidance of pain and the seeking of pleasure what motivates all human
activity? Are human rights in fact inborn aspects of human nature? In the terminology of
Aristotle, what qualities were essentially human and which were only accidentally so.
These questions and more motivated me to do a historical analysis of the theory of
individualism.
Being largely motivated by a desire to understand the American culture, I first
investigated John Locke’s work due to its influence on the founding fathers of this nation.
I read his Second Treatise and found in it a steady usage of a concept of individualism, but
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could find no theoretical underpinnings for the concept itself. I turned to his Essays and
his Letter Concerning Toleration and delved into what he thought motivated humans to
act. I also read some historical analysis and biographic information on Locke to find what
had motivated him and perhaps what influenced him. I found the classic concept of an
individual comes largely (although not entirely) from Locke’s time. Locke himself goes a
long way to formulate a theory of individualism (although I never saw it explicitly spelled
out in such terms). For Locke, individuals have a natural state and the purpose of
governments is to prevent certain aspects of this natural state from being promoted while
allowing others to continue. Governments are supposed to prevent the “state of war”
while promoting the “laws of reason.”
Next I turned to John Stuart Mill because he makes what is most likely the
strongest case for individualism (in the traditional sense of the term). I began by reading
On Liberty and Utilitarianism but slowly realized I had to turn to his Logic to find a
thorough explanation of his concept of human nature. I also found Mill to be a conflicted
philosopher; in On Liberty he describes humans as primarily creative, free and desiring to
stay so. But in his Logic, where he uses a more thoroughly empirical method of
explanation, he describes humans as determined by necessary factors, almost mechanically
operating. It is supposedly just this tension, between freedom and necessity, which
brought about his emotional break-down, and it was a tension he apparently struggled
with for the remainder of his years. On the one hand, he wanted to describe humans as
motivated to act based upon a small set of characteristics, but on the other hand, he did
not believe that human interaction could possibly be described with such a set. His
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tendency toward Bentham’s hedonic explanation was never far from his mind, but after the
death of his father and Bentham, he began to distance himself farther from each.
Then I turned to John Dewey, arriving at an American perspective on the tradition.
As is the case with any research on Dewey’s thought, I had to turn to multiple books and
multiple articles, from Individualism Old and New to Freedom and Culture to Human
Nature and Conduct and beyond. Individualism was a theme that Dewey investigated
throughout the corpus of his work; he took this issue very seriously because it had become
a large cultural factor for American life. The old theory of individualism which held
humans to be born equipped with natural rights, the state of nature and even the
calculating utilitarian view of humans had made American into a house divided upon itself.
On the one hand, people nominally espoused a theory of rugged individualism. On the
other hand, almost all of our activities require or culminate in collective action be it
corporate business, team sports, civic life or even just communication. Very little of what
went for American life turned out to be individual endeavor. So Dewey offered a new
individualism, one where we recognize the interconnected nature of political life, where
we do not view ourselves as atomically separable from one another. Therefore, Dewey
suggested we take seriously the fact that our “beliefs” differed from our actions and
recommended changing our beliefs about what it is to be an individual to incorporate the
influence of culture and others more centrally. Does this end in a “group think” or some
other such collectivist mentality? Dewey did not believe so, unless democratic activity is to
be considered such.
Finally I end my thesis with some critical remarks on each thinker’s theories and
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utilizing Dewey’s theory of ends-means continuum I explicated what I believed was the
next means in line to accomplish a new individualism: public philosophic discourse. I
believe now more than ever philosophers should enter into public debates in order to be
cultural critics and assist in assessing cultural practices.
Political, cultural, religious and military leaders during the lives of each thinker had
taken qualities which were accidental or coincidental about humans and wrongly
considered them to be the basis for selective treatment, privilege and the determiner of
inheritance of wealth, education and power. Locke criticized the supposed lineage of
Adam combined in conjunction with divine revelation that was the basis for the dominance
of the landed Aristocracy of his time. Mill questioned how majoritarian democracy
combined with limited suffrage and the rise of influence of industrialists could serve to
better the conditions of individuals in his day. Dewey condemned the dehumanization that
was experienced during the Great Depression and chastised the status quo practice of noninterventionist economic policies for the staggering unemployment as well as the
exploitation of labor without appropriate compensation.
Each of these three thinkers was criticizing specific environmental conditions
during their life. While their thought can be extrapolated and utilized outside of this
context, it should be done with caution and hesitancy. The continued use of Locke’s
theories, once the dominant force of Aristocracy had waned, led to the exploitation of
majoritarianism. Continued existence of Locke’s thought combined with aspects of Mill’s
Utilitarianism formed the intellectual background which Dewey criticized. The sustained
belief in outmoded and inadequate ideas in the face of changing or changed cultural,
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social, technological and economic conditions results in the need for an adaptation or
abandonment of fossilized cultural habits97; what is required is a new inquiry resulting in a
changed conception of an individual through the use of human intelligence.

II. Criticisms of Locke
There are five reasons for questioning Locke’s theories as appropriate for
contemporary circumstances. The first deals with his dual state of nature and war and the
innateness of reason, the second deals with internal inconsistencies in the role of reason
for Locke, third is a criticism of the innateness of war to human nature. Fourth, I criticize
Locke’s faith in the laws of reason. Finally a criticism is offered comparing Locke’s theory
of ownership to contemporary corporatism.
John Locke’s theory of the state of nature, as adopted from Hobbes, is a two-sided
coin. On the one side there exists the rational co-existence of humans, living by the laws of
reason and in harmony. On the other side exists the state of war, where humans impinge
upon the freedom of others, perhaps even to the point of taking their lives. While these
two explanations appear to describe quite a large amount of human behavior, Locke also
described human reason as being innate, god-given and complete. One of the central
problems with Locke’s description of a dual-natured human nature is that the state of war
only comes about from the corruption of reason. However, if he wishes to base innate and
inalienable human rights upon the presence of reason, how would it ever be possible for
reason to fail? If reason is such a thoroughly ingrained aspect of our human nature, it
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appears contradictory, then, for humans to ever be capable of entering into a state of war.
Either reason is not inalienable (or said differently, humans are fallible and therefore
Locke’s foundation for human rights is shaky at best) or humans should be incapable of
entering the state of war. The former is clearly at odds with Locke’s work and the second
is patently false; humans enter into war with one another all too frequently. Therefore,
Locke’s theory of the inalienable innateness of reason needs to be modified to allow for
the corruption of said reason. But if such a theoretical move is made, would those people
whose reason is corrupt no longer be eligible for human rights? Without further revision, it
would appear individuals with corrupted or incompletely cultivated reason would not, by
Locke’s account, be eligible for human rights.
Another tension found within Locke’s theories exists in his conception of humans
as tabula rosa at birth compared to his conception of reason as an arbiter of right from
wrong. On the one hand, Locke wishes to criticize innate ideas (in order to unseat the
landed gentry as well as provide a criticism of divine revelation in general), but on the
other hand his description of reason as the basis for harmonious co-existence in the state
of nature appears to support a sort of innateness in reason’s ability to arbitrate between
right and wrong action. For Locke, either reason has the ability to innately know good
action from bad action, or humans must cultivate reason to know good actions from bad
actions. If humans must cultivate reason to know good actions from bad ones, then appeal
to reason as the arbiter of right from wrong without appeal to the cultivation of reason is
either empty or disingenuous.
Locke considers the “State of War” to be an aspect of human nature. When reason
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fails to arbitrate tensions, war is inevitable. But in Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey
criticizes the innateness of war to human nature. While Dewey admits that war is “woven
out of the stuff of instinctive activity”98 for humans, this does not mean that the act of war
itself is instinctual. The conditions for the possibility for war stem from “anger, pugnacity,
rivalry, self-display, and such like native tendencies”99 but are not themselves determined
by these drives. Further “pugnacity and fear are no more native than are pity and
sympathy”100 but rather are themselves habituated responses to native impulses; to believe
these will inevitably end in warfare is “as if the savage were to believe that because he uses
fibers having fixed natural properties in order to weave baskets, therefore his immemorial
tribal patterns are also natural necessities and immutable forms.”101 A stronger case that
war is not native to our nature is made when Dewey stated that
pugnacity, rivalry, vainglory, love of booty, fear, suspicion, anger, desire
for freedom from conventions and restrictions of peace, love of power and
hatred of oppression, opportunity for novel displays, love of home and soil,
attachment to one’s people and to the altar and the hearth, courage, loyalty,
opportunity to make a name, money or a career, affection, piety to
ancestors and ancestral gods – all of these things and many more make up
the war-like force. To suppose there is some one unchanging native force
which generates war is as naïve as the usual assumption that our enemy is
actuated solely by the meaner of the tendencies named and we only by the
nobler.102
The impulses and habits which lead to war are not native to human nature; they are
acquired responses handed down and habituated by continuous use, generation after
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generation.103 To be sure, war is a deeply ingrained habit, perhaps, but to call it an innate
aspect of human nature appears to be a hasty generalization.
Locke put great stock in the laws of reason. He believed that were it the case that
all individuals were fully cultivated in reason, living by the laws of reason alone would
bring about the state of nature and require no intervention by governments or other
political bodies. People would, in effect, live in a state of perfect harmony with one
another, were they only to follow the laws of reason. However, Dewey was critical of this
theory when he stated that
The aroma of the continental tradition brings about the sayings of those
who settle so many social problems to their own satisfaction by invoking a
distinction between liberty and liscense, identifying the former with “liberty
under law” – for in the classic tradition law and reason are related as child
and parent. So far as the saying assigns to law an origin and authority
having nothing to do with freedom, so far, that is, as it affirms the
impossibility of free conditions determining their own law, it posits directly,
even if unintentionally, to the totalitarian state.104
Reason, by this argument, dictates to the laws their possibility of freedom. However,
whenever a condition exists such that the law is dictated by a source other than “free
conditions,”105 it runs the very real risk of fascism, totalitarianism, dictatorship or tyranny.
Faith in reason, devoid of the conditions required to bring about freedom, is just one more
misplaced faith. Recognition of slavery is not the same as actualizing freedom. The role
and use of reason to bring about freedom is only ever one factor of many. Taking reason
103
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as the sole arbiter of freedom is a course of action that runs the very real risk of
overturning the very goal it aims at.
Locke’s theory of ownership stated that mixing one’s labor with natural products
is the basis for granting ownership of the finished product. This very straight-forward
principle, when applied to the labor of contemporary corporate practices appears
conflicted. On the one hand, people are free to sell their labor, on the market, for whatever
price it will garner. This appears to be quite in line with Locke’s theory of value.
However, corporate laborers are incapable of controlling the means by which they labor;
many are not able to come into the possession of the machines and financial resources
necessary to perform contemporary business practices outside of pure chance or dumb
luck. The inability to own land, in Locke’s time, was the main focus of his theory of labor
precisely because it was the means by which people could labor freely and not at the whim
of another. Since ownership of the means of labor are not at the disposal of those now
working, it appears that contemporary practices are at odds with Locke’s concept of
ownership.

III. Criticisms of Mill
This section will consist of five criticisms of Mill’s philosophy. I question the
“profit and loss” mentality of the theory of utility as being little different than bottom-line
pecuniary practice. Next I question the consequentialist bent of Mill’s philosophy and how
this can support atrocious means if the end result is “good.” Then I discuss Mill’s view of
society as an aggregate of individuals and criticize this view as too narrowly fixated on
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individuals. Following that, I criticize Mill’s theory of freedom and harm as too narrowly
focused on the result rather than the means to accomplishing it. Finally, I apply Mill’s
harm principle to some contemporary corporate practices.
Dewey says of Utilitarianism, the doctrine Mill openly and loudly espouses, that it
is a theory which “consists in calculation of courses of action on the basis of “profit and
loss” to which they lead.”106 Even in light of Mill’s modification of Bentham’s hedonic
calculus to a more qualitative or ethical calculus, still the central criticism remains sound.
Taking profit and loss as the basis for determining action, however, can often result in
performing actions for another which that individual would not like performed in the name
of utility. Wiredu has argued that while Mill did at points claim to have included the
Golden Rule in his conception of utility, even going so far as to claim that “to do as you
would be done by … and to love your neighbor as yourself” are the highest formulations
of the principle of utility, nevertheless the Golden Rule was not explicitly stated in the
principle of utility.107 If the Golden Rule is how we are supposed to interpret the principle
of utility, why not include its formulation as a principle (if not the principle) of
Utilitarianism? Evidently even intelligent commentators did not realize its “centrality”
otherwise they would not have pushed him to make the statements I quoted earlier.
Without some variation of the Golden Rule, Utilitarianism’s inclination to profit and loss
thinking easily habituates an individual into operating on bottom-line thinking. It is no
surprise that many businessmen today espouse something like a Utilitarian mindset (albeit
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devoid of a principle such as the Golden Rule).
Another criticism of Mill’s theories is of their consequentialist inclination. A
consequentialist theory determines the rightness or wrongness of an action or rule based
upon its actual consequence. While at first blush this appears entirely sensible, some rather
disturbing means can be used to accomplish otherwise praiseworthy ends. Take, for
instance, the preemptive invasion of a country in order to free said country of a brutal
dictatorship. While the end, were it accomplished, is an admirable and praiseworthy end, if
the means of accomplishing this are the bloody and devastating use of military might,
many individuals shudder to accept this as an acceptable course of events. A thoroughgoing Utilitarian would tally up the profits (no more brutal dictatorship) versus the losses
(civilian casualties, the temporary disruption of economic progress, destruction of
infrastructure, etc.). If the pain and suffering caused by the continuation of the dictatorship
are outweighed by the benefits of its overthrow, regardless of the means needed to
accomplish it, so be it. A strong criticism of this is Dewey’s continuum of ends and means.
On this he states that
means are means; they are intermediates, middle terms. To grasp this fact is
to have done with the ordinary dualism of means and ends. The “end” is
merely a series of actions viewed at a remote stage; and a means is merely
the series viewed at an earlier one.108
Since I never encountered a similar reliance upon the continuum of ends and means in
Mill, I am only left assuming it is lacking. With this ends-means continuum lacking,
unsavory means could be utilized to bring about otherwise “useful” or even “good” ends.
Another way of stating this is some ends would be pursued by any means necessary. But
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if Dewey’s continuum of means and ends is correct, brutal means result in nothing other
than brutal ends. The bloody means are the end viewed at an “earlier time” while the “end”
would be those means viewed at a later time. Said differently, Dewey would be critical of
any attempt to bring about peace through violence, any attempt to bring about democracy
through tyranny and any attempt to bring about freedom through enslavement. Mill, also,
might also have been unwilling to accept these courses of action, but his writings are silent
on the matter.
Mill’s harm principle states that human freedom should ring out and stop only
where it impinges upon the ability of others to likewise be free. However, this formulation
of freedom ignores the concrete social, political, economic, and other conditions that
allow for freedom. Someone may not be capable of entering freely into a course of action,
whether it harms anyone or not. Merely placing harm as the limitation does little to
produce freedom. Case in point, the victims of Hurricane Katrina were “free to leave”
New Orleans whenever they wanted. No one was preventing them from leaving. However,
lacking the material ability (i.e. lacking ownership of a vehicle) prevented them from
leaving. In effect, they were less free than those who owned vehicles. While no one
directly caused them harm, still their freedom was checked. Without theory specifically
directed at meliorating this difficulty, Mill’s theory of freedom appears inadequate.
A final criticism is in light of the application (or rather the lack of application) of
his harm principle. Taking Mill’s harm principle at face value, harm is the arbiter of where
freedom is checked. Dumping of toxic chemicals that would otherwise be expensive to
dispose of, speeding to sale products not fully tested for safety in order to save money on
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research and development, as well as lobbying efforts meant to motivate nations to war by
munitions manufacturers are all examples of common corporate practices that would
violate Mill’s harm principle.
While the Utilitarianism mindset of profit and loss may have been widely adopted,
the greatest good for the greatest number has not been so likewise adopted, nor has Mill’s
harm principle. Taken in piecemeal, the principle of utility without the principle of the
greatest good is dangerous. Consequentialist thinking combined with the mentality of
“profit and loss,” and non-social atomistic individualism, make for a dangerous
concoction.

IV. Criticisms of Dewey
I discuss three problems with Dewey’s theories. I question Dewey’s optimism in
democracy, examine his description of returning to immediate experience, especially as
related to people who readily and quickly drop into their cognitive mode, and I examine
Dewey’s support of armed conflict in WWI in light of his ends and means continuum.
Dewey had great faith in the ability for Democracy to arrive at the most intelligent
solution to a given problem. Through collaboration and deliberation a community of
inquirers was better equipped than any single inquirer to arrive at the best available course
of action. However, Dewey had failed to take into account the influence of widespread
propaganda usage and how insidious this form of mass suggestion could be on individuals
until after the end of World War I. Rather than promoting discussion and engaging the
public on a given issue, mass suggestion limits issues to short “sound bites” easily
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digestible and requiring little in the way of critical engagement. Mass media in the form of
radio and television had subdued public debate more thoroughly than ever before. Instead
of acting democratically and creatively, people separate into bitterly divided camps along
loose and shaky grounds. To be fair, Dewey had envisioned a restructuring of the
institution of public education to combat this effect, but lacking implementation,
democratic activity became little more than mass suggestibility and empty verbiage on the
part of public officials to avoid commitment to a position that could be criticized.
Dewey’s concept of immediate experience can be characterized, with little in the
way of violence to the theory, as returning to homeostasis. When problems or situations
far outside of normal expectation of events occur, Dewey stated that we drop out of the
immediacy of experience and enter into a diagnostic mode of sort. Typically, this mode
was the cognitive mode (if people’s habits are properly oriented), but it could easily be the
aesthetic, political, ethical or any number of other modes. The point of entering this new
mode was to interpret the experience, incorporate it, direct it and return to immediacy.
However, there exists a pugnacious group of individuals that appear to violate this rule
continuously and Dewey himself belonged to such a group: philosophers.
By most accounts, philosophers spend as much, if not more time, utilizing the
cognitive mode of experience than they do in its immediate form.109 Too often the
immediate mode is the less familiar to those who feel more comfortable dropping into the
cognitive mode of experience. Aristotle went so far as to describe cognition as the greatest
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end for which humans are suited, rather than just a mode utilized for problem solving.110
Dewey supported America’s entrance into WWI because he believed doing
otherwise would be disastrous for America and perhaps even for all of Europe. His
outspoken support of armed conflict appears deeply at odds with 1) his own preference
for non-violence and 2) his means-ends continuum. The first criticism perhaps can be
circumvented by stating something along the lines of “in times of dire need, preferences
should be overlooked, even on matters of major importance.” While this statement may
be true, it does nothing to protect against the second criticism: if war is the means, how
could Dewey have conceived of an end that was positive? It appears to be an outright
contradiction to hold the continuum of means and ends (to see means as “steps on the
path” toward an end) where bloodshed and violence is the means and the democratic
community is the end.

V. Closing Remarks
For traditional Liberal thinkers, a “grab-bag” of theoretical positions has
historically gone “hand-in-hand.” To begin, there is Locke’s empiricism whereby all
knowledge is reducible to sense-experience. Anything else is merely the gluing together of
sense experience known as reason. Once committed to a view of sense-datum and mere
relations of ideas, materialism comes easily afterwards. All of this is in accord with certain
modern thinkers, who hold there are either mental substances, or there are physical
substances; a dualism adopted from Descartes. This dualism was pushed further when
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Descartes’ incompatibility of interaction of substances forced Modern thinkers to choose
either a plurality of non-interacting pre-established substances (Leibniz’ monadology) or a
single substance (Spinoza’s idealism). Sense-datum falls squarely under the category of
physical “stuffs” and so Locke believed an empirical epistemology committed one to a
material ontology and denied any purely “mental” substance.
Materialism, in turn, goes side-by-side with a mechanistic conception of the
universe adopted from Newtonian or Cartesian physics. Causal determinism follows from
mechanistic materialism and so many empiricists are likewise committed to causal
determinism. Where in this model exists freedom, some ask. It appears to systematize the
universe and make no room for freedom save for “the absence of external impediments”
that Hobbes posited in Leviathan. Humans, in this vision, are mere phenomenon operating
entirely causally and determined from the point of creation; a re-hashing of Leibniz’ preestablished harmony has effectively occurred, even though his ontological monadology is
rejected in favor of materialism. It is no surprise that these thinkers also believe human
rights can be little more than the removing of “artificial” blockages to the inherently “free”
human nature. After all, “freedom” in this view is something inherent and inborn; it needs
only the removal of the chains of society before it can be actualized.
However, if this freedom is omnipresent in human nature, no institution would be
capable of stamping it out. It would be “ontologically prior” to any intervention on the
part of culture or experience. A conception of laissez faire would of course follow, by
removing “artificial” blockages, human freedom could ring out. Historically this is
precisely what occurred. The conceptual tension of blocking immutable aspects of human
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nature with “artificial” institutions was glossed in order to institute pecuniary practices
that favored the rising dominance of the middle-class and merchants. .
Just as John Donne stated that “no man is an Island unto himself,” a theory of
individualism, especially as espoused by thinkers such as John Dewey, erodes the dualism
of self and society. I do not believe this commits one to some version of communism, but
rather a variant of socialism or perhaps communalism, where private ownership and
common ownership converge at a happy medium. Neither the “individual” nor the
collective as a whole are taken as logically prior; rather, the individual is a part of society
and society exists as more than merely a collection of individuals. Societal factors loom
large in any given human’s life, but there would be no societies save for the existence of
humans. Neither could exist without the other.
At this point, some may ask why an individual could not live without social
existence; Aristotle called such entities that lived outside of social life either “Gods or
beasts” but not people. Further, a newborn child could not exist for more than a single day
(perhaps less) without the altruistic intervention of another, typically its paternal
guardians. Therefore human community is required for anyone to reach adulthood. Feral
children, children raised by other animals, never develop beyond simple animalistic
instincts and therefore do not cultivate their innate reason, human intelligence or their
ability to communicate with others outside of simple yelps, grunts and moans. Even feral
children must be a minimum age before being abandoned else they do not live at all.
Likewise, were a fully developed and cultivated person to retreat forever into solitude,
they would bring with them the acquired social intelligence of their culture, history and
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education as learned from others.
Philosophy serves as one social factor that plays a role in the development of
individuals. Just as more “concrete” factors of economics, politics, military conquest,
religious activity, education and mass media play pivotal roles in contributing to the
absence of human freedom, so also does philosophy play a role of systematizing these
influences and abstracting them from specific situations into general concepts and allowing
for the identification of proper weight. But systemization occurs only if philosophy
discusses “cultural conditions, conditions of science, art, morality, religion, education and
industry so as to discover which of them in actuality promote and which retard the
development of the native constituents of human nature.”111 If the bulk of the critical
philosophy being produced by “the schools”112 continues to be myopically concerned with
necessary conditions of language rather than the applications of languages to social
conditions, philosophy has ushered in another age of counting how many angels fit on the
head of a pin.
The “Linguistic Turn” of 20th century philosophy ushered in an age of formalism
that Dewey had long feared would occur. By formalizing philosophy, larger and messier
issues such as social justice become mere “linguistic anomalies.”113 Why must many
philosophers in America be largely silent rather than constantly and loudly engage in
discussing those activities which promote and retard the constituents of human nature?
Power-brokers in Washington do not accept such limitations nor do the International
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Monetary Fund and World Bank harbor any such limitation of scope.
It is not that public philosophy is impotent or lacking a voice; we are merely
purposely self-muted. When philosophers such as Peter Singer communicate with the
wider public, there are mixed reactions. Some hate him for his message, many do not
understand him, but those who do understand him often find it compelling and interesting.
Those not steeped in the canon of philosophy are not swayed by deconstructionalist
arguments, post-modern puzzles or analytic formalism. They are engaged by discussions
about the rich and the poor, access to healthcare, environmental degradation and political
reform. Formalizing these issues will do little to resolve them.
It is just these issues that philosophers need to focus on in order to empower
philosophy, engage the public, become more involved with melioration of societal ills and
work to reduce suffering. It is also these issues that philosophers are largely silent about.
There are rare individuals that venture onto the public stage, but they are few and far
between. Paradoxically, with the largest enrollment of the American Philosophical
Association than ever before, there are likewise fewer public Intellectuals than ever before.
Therefore to enter again the public stage, philosophers must examine the concrete
practical effects of the current and existent social conditions and take these as a starting
point. Then, we must imagine a point in the future that is desired to be attained. Then we
must project the most immediate means to accomplish this end. Finally, we should
examine the power structures that exist which promote widespread injustice and attempt
to mediate their influence.
Locke has shown that it is possible to contribute to the bloodless disruption of a
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hegemonic power by loudly criticizing the assumptions which its system is based upon.
Mill’s time in parliament saw an expansion of suffrage, the first work on women’s suffrage
and child labor laws. During Dewey’s life, he was pivotal in founding organizations such
as the NAACP, the Teacher’s Union and he also sat on the trial of Trotsky, in Mexico.
Many existing social ills can be meliorated, but only through the use of intelligence, careful
planning and the intervention of people willing to question the indoctrination of the status
quo. This is the spirit of Socrates as he ceaselessly questioned those in power showing
that they, by and large, did not deserve the responsibilities they held. It is the role of
philosophy to be the watchdog of freedom.
Dewey took culture to be the most active aspect of human nature and he took the
role of philosophy to be a critic of culture. Combine this with the fact that culture, and not
power, or love of money, or love of freedom or some other supposed “psychological
factor” is at the root of human action, then criticism of culture is a far more influential role
than most philosophers are willing to admit. But philosophers are only critics of culture
when they engage cultural issues. Therefore, unless philosophers once more engage in
criticism of culture, especially pecuniary culture, then love of money and power will
continue to be dominant explanations for human motivation. Much like when an
inappropriate diagnosis of a medical condition is made, steps to meliorate current social
ills will continue to be ineffective at best and counter-effective at worst without the
correct ailment in mind.
In conclusion, in order to isolate which conditions “promote and which retard the
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development of the native constituents of human nature,” 114 it is important to focus on
educational reform. With educational experimentation focused on promoting the native
constituents of human nature to assist individuals in becoming self-directing, flourishing
members of communities, it is possible for those that come after us to receive their culture
“more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have
received it”115 such that they may more easily adapt to the conditions they face. The reader
will here have to excuse me since the educational consequences of individualism go
beyond the scope of this work and therefore must be the subject of a monograph of their
own.
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